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The Financial Banking Institute 
Act and the Financial CHOICE Act: 




Following the financial crisis of 2007-2008, public trust in 
financial institutions plummeted to historic lows1 and has yet 
to fully recover.2 In the years leading up to the financial crisis 
of 2007-2008 many financial institutions were allowed a 
virtual field day, allowing for “poor monetary policy, 
deregulation, bad regulation, innovation run amok, and 
* J.D. Candidate (2019), University of Maryland Francis King Carey
School of Law. The author would like to thank the Executive Board and
editorial staff of the Journal of Business and Technology Law for their
hard work and support. The author would also like to thank his family
for their encouragement and support.
1 Frank Newport, Americans’ Confidence in Institutions Edges Up,
GALLUP NEWS (June 26, 2017), http://news.gallup.com/poll/212840/
americans-confidence-institutions-edges.aspx (finding that American
confidence in American “big businesses” hit a low of 16 percent in 2009
and American trust in banks declined ten percent from 2008 to 2009 from
32 to 22 percent—the lowest reported percentage in over 40 years).
2 Justin McCarthy, Americans’ Confidence in Banks Still Languishing
Below 30%, GALLUP NEWS (June 16, 2016), http://news.gallup.com/poll/
192719/americans-confidence-banks-languishing-below.aspx (noting that
“[t]he current percentage of adults who say they have confidence in banks
is just half of what it was in 2004”).
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greed” to gain a stranglehold on the American economy.3 
While financial institutions cannot exclusively be blamed for 
the crisis, they must be held accountable in order to prevent 
subsequent financial crises.4  
In response to the financial crisis, Congress enacted 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”).5 Dodd-Frank was created to 
“improve systemic stability, improve policy options for coping 
with failing financial firms, increase transparency 
throughout financial markets, and protect consumers and 
investors.”6 The Dodd-Frank Act implemented a number of 
provisions designed to further transparency, accountability, 
and stability in the American financial sector.7 One of these 
reforms was the creation of the Orderly Liquidation 
Authority, designed to quickly and efficiently liquidate 
failing large financial firms.8 The Dodd-Frank Act also 
established the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (the 
“CFPB”) which allows for enhanced prudential regulation 
and heightened standards of accountability and stability.9 
Furthermore, the Act also created what is known as the 
Volcker Rule, a ban on proprietary trading—trading that is 
intended to benefit the bank, not the bank’s customers.10 In 
addition to these reforms, Dodd-Frank ushered in a culture 
                                                 
3 Adam J. Levitin, The Crisis Without a Face: Emerging Narratives of the 
Financial Crisis, 63 U. MIAMI. L. REV. 999, 1000 (2009). 
4 Anton R. Valukas, White-Collar Crime and Economic Recession, 2010 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 21 (2010). 
5 Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. ch. 53 
(2012).  
6 BAIRD WEBEL, CONG. RES. SERV., R41350, THE DODD-FRANK WALL 
STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: ISSUES AND SUMMARY 
3 (2010). 
7 See id.  
8 12 U.S.C.A, § 5384 (2015). 
9 12 U.S.C. § 5491 (2012).  
10 12 U.S.C.A. § 1851 (2018). 
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change, eschewing the toxic and greed fueled culture in favor 
of a more diverse and transparent culture.  
In 2017, Congress made significant moves to abrogate 
much of the Dodd-Frank Act.11 On April 5, 2017, the House 
of Representatives passed the Financial Institution 
Bankruptcy Act of 2017 (“FIBA”).12 FIBA would invalidate 
many of the provisions of Dodd-Frank which govern the 
liquidation of failing major financial institutions and would 
create a new-subchapter in Chapter 11 for financial 
institutions with financial assets of at least $50 billion.13 
Additionally, on June 10, 2017 the House of Representatives 
passed the Financial CHOICE Act of 2017 (“CHOICE Act”).14 
The CHOICE Act repeals a number of provisions of the Dodd-
Frank Act, including the Orderly Liquidation Authority,15 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,16 and the 
Volcker Rule,17 among a number of other provisions.18 
This comment argues that FIBA and the CHOICE Act 
place too much power and freedom back in the hands of those 
who bear substantial responsibility for the worst economic 
                                                 
11 Bruce Grohsgal, Do the Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act and the 
CHOICE Act Undermine an Effective Restructuring of a Failing Financial 
Institution?, HARV. L. SCH.: BANKR. ROUND TABLE (Jun. 13, 2017), 
http://blogs.harvard.edu/bankruptcyroundtable/2017/06/13/financial-
institution-bankruptcy-act/ (noting that both the Financial Institution 
Bankruptcy Act and the Financial CHOICE Act would repeal key 
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act).  
12 Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act of 2017, H.R. 1667, 115th Cong. 
(2017). 
13 Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act of 2017, H.R. 1667, 115th Cong. 
§§ 2(a)(9A)(B), 2(b)(1) (2017). 
14 H.R. 10, 115th Cong. (2017). 
15 H.R. 10, 115th Cong. § 111 (2017). 
16 Id. at § 711. 
17 Id. at § 901. 
18 See id. 
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crisis since the Great Depression.19 The Dodd-Frank Act is by 
no means a perfect solution to the problems stemming from 
the Great Recession.20 However, the proposed bills purport to 
strip away key provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act and replace 
them with token gestures of regulation that allow financial 
institutions many of the freedoms they enjoyed prior to the 
financial crisis of 2007.21 Simply because the United States 
economy has weathered the financial tumult of the crisis does 
not mean that we can afford to relax financial regulations.22 
FIBA and the Financial CHOICE Act propose dangerous 
relaxations of crucial financial regulations, which may allow 
the United States to fall back into the mire of financial 
corruption, misguided monetary policy, and unchecked 
corporate greed.23 In the absence of meaningful alternative 
financial regulations, Dodd-Frank must be upheld, perhaps 







                                                 
19 See Josh Bivens, Worst Economic Crisis Since the Great Depression? By 
a Long Shot., ECON. POL’Y INST: ECON. SNAPSHOT (Jan. 27, 2010), http:// 
www.epi.org/publication/snapshot_20100127/; infra Part II.B. 
20 Id. 
21 See infra Part II.C. 
22 Id.  
23 See infra Parts II.B., II.C. 
24 Mark J. Roe, Financial Scholars Oppose Eliminating “Orderly 
Liquidation Authority” As Crisis-Avoidance Restructuring Backstop, 
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I. THE DODD-FRANK ACT: ESTABLISHING 
TRANSPARENCY IN THE MURKY WORLD OF WALL 
STREET 
 
A. The Need for Economic and Moral Reform 
 
The driving force behind the Great Recession was the abrupt 
drop of housing prices in 2007, following years of steep 
increases.25 The housing crisis was exacerbated by reckless 
lending practices and excessive risk taking, resulting in 
major financial institutions sustaining massive losses.26 
During the housing crisis, a number of the most prominent 
financial institutions in the United States reported 
staggering, and sometimes fatal, losses.27 The dire status of 
the United States financial sector prompted a tax-payer 
funded government bailout for many major institutions and 
on September 28, 2009, Congress passed a $700 billion 
bailout plan.28 However, even after the bailout plan passed, 
confidence in the American financial market remained low 
amongst both financial institutions themselves and the 
American people.29 As a result, the era of “easy credit, over-
indulgence, and over-leveraging” gave way to an era of 
unemployment, reduced consumer spending, and distrust in 
the American financial market that had not been seen in 
                                                 
25 Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the 
Financial Crisis, 13 N.C. BANK. INST. 5, 7 (2009).  
26 Id.  
27 Id. at 8-9 (noting that the financial crisis led to the extinction of 
financial giants Bear Sterns and Lehman Brothers; financially crippled a 
number of preeminent financial institutions such as Merrill Lynch, 
Wachovia, A.I.G., Citigroup, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac; facilitated 
the failure of large savings and loan companies Washington Mutual and 
IndyMac Bank; and led to the extinction of the last two large independent 
invest banks in existence: Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs).   
28 Id. at 78. 
29 Id. at 79; McCarthy, supra note 2.  
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decades.30 In response, the American public demanded 
accountability from Wall Street.31 
 
B. Key Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act: The 
Orderly Liquidation Authority 
 
The Dodd-Frank Act establishes an organization known as 
the Orderly Liquidation Authority (“the OLA”).32 The OLA is 
an authority that is empowered to quickly handle the 
liquidation of major financial institutions during times of 
economic crisis.33 Rather than bankruptcy judges, the OLA is 
comprised of financial regulators and financial experts.34 In 
addition to the Orderly Liquidation Authority, Title II of the 
Dodd-Frank Act also creates the Orderly Liquidation Fund.35 
This fund authorizes the OLA to issue loans to financial 
institutions that are deemed “systemically important.”36 
                                                 
30 Moran, supra note 25, at 99-100.  
31 See Daniel Kaufman, Corruption and the Global Financial Crisis, 
FORBES (Jan. 27, 2009), https://www.forbes.com/2009/01/27/corruption-
financial-crisis-business-corruption09_0127corruption.html#38fd183061 
b3 (contending that “[d]eep-seated transparency reforms need to be a 
cornerstone” of financial reform and these reforms “should apply to U.S. 
public agencies as well as domestic and international financial 
institutions.”). 
32 12 U.S.C.A. § 5384 (2015). 
33 Paul L. Lee, The Dodd-Frank Act Orderly Liquidation Authority: A 
Preliminary Analysis and Critique – Part II, 128 BANK. L.J. 867, 867 
(2011). 
34 Ben S. Bernanke, Why Dodd-Frank’s Orderly Liquidation Authority 
Should Be Preserved, BROOKINGS INST. (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www. 
brookings.edu/blog/ben-bernanke/2017/02/28/why-dodd-franks-orderly-
liquidation-authority-should-be-preserved/. 
35 12 U.S.C.A. § 5384 (2015). 
36 Aaron Klein, A Primer on Dodd-Frank’s Orderly Liquidation Authority, 
BROOKINGS INST. (Jun. 5, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-
front/2017/06/05/a-primer-on-dodd-franks-orderly-liquidation-authority/ 
(explaining that “Dodd-Frank extended the FDIC’s authority to resolve 
failed institutions beyond commercial banks to include the entire bank 
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These loans have come under heavy criticism for serving as 
nothing more than a façade for more taxpayer bailouts.37 
However, the loans are not taxpayer bailouts because the 
Dodd-Frank Act mandates that these loans are backed by the 
assets of the financial institutions. Moreover, these loans are 
recovered during the resolution process, and if recovery is not 
feasible, loans will otherwise be obtained from other major 
financial institutions.38  
 
C. Key Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act: 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
 
Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act establishes the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (“the CFPB”).39 The CFPB was 
designed with the intent of curbing many of the regulatory 
deficiencies leading up to and culminating in the financial 
crisis of 2007-2008.40 The CFPB was designed to consolidate 
a wide array of financial regulations, prevent consumer 
protection from being “subordinated to regulatory concerns 
about bank profitability,” and ensure that financial 
regulators wield the necessary and requisite financial 
expertise to ensure implementation of effective regulations.41 
Congress empowered the CFPB with general 
rulemaking, supervision, and enforcement authority over a 
wide array of institutions that fall within the ambit of the 
consumer financial services industry.42 The CFPB has broad 
authority to hold large financial institutions to stricter rules 
                                                 
holding company and all firms designated as Systemically Important 
Financial Institutions (SIFIs).”). 
37 Roe, supra note 24. 
38 Id.  
39 12 U.S.C. § 5491 (2012). 
40 Webel, supra note 6, at 10. 
41 Adam J. Levitin, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An 
Introduction, 32 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 321, 331, 343 (2013). 
42 Id. at 322. 
 Financial Banking Institute Act and Financial CHOICE Act 
Journal of Business & Technology Law 114 
 
and regulations concerning transparency and stability.43 
Such broad authority over the financial markets has 
garnered substantial criticism by many who fear that with 
such vast authority, regulators will again rescue failing 
financial institutions with taxpayer dollars.44 
 
D. Key Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act: The 
Volcker Rule  
 
Another key provision of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Volcker 
Rule, implements a ban commercial banks engaging in 
proprietary trading.45 Proprietary trading is high-risk 
trading, wherein bank employees will engage in highly 
speculative trading in order to make a profit for the bank 
rather than the bank’s customers.46 In the early 2000s 
proprietary trading was commonplace, as banks and their 
affiliates ran rampant with morally and financially dubious 
investments and trade deals in search of higher profits, 
salaries, and bonuses.47 Furthermore, proprietary trading 
                                                 
43 Webel, supra note 6, at 11-12.  
44 Steven A. Ramirez, Dodd-Frank as Maginot Line, 15 CHAP. L. REV. 109, 
123 (2011) (explaining that many financial experts believe that “too many 
avenues remain open for regulators to rescue creditors of large banks, 
and that those regulators now have a proven track record of indulging 
powerful bank interests”). 
45 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (2012).  
46 Stacy Goto Grant, Note, International Financial Regulation Through 
the G20: The Proprietary Trading Case Study, 45 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1217, 
1221 (2014). 
47 Jeff Merkley & Carl Levin, The Dodd-Frank Act Restrictions on 
Proprietary Trading and Conflicts of Interest: New Tools to Address 
Evolving Threats, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 515, 522 (2011) (labeling 
proprietary trading methods of major financial institutions prior to the 
financial crisis of 2007-2008 as “increasingly complex and risky”); Onnig 
H. Dombalagian, Proprietary Trading: Of Scourges, Scapegoats, and 
Scofflaws Twenty-Fifth Annual Corporate Law Symposium: 
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presents substantial conflict of interest issues between large 
banks and their customers.48 By engaging in highly 
speculative and risky trading on the customers’ behalf, banks 
create the potential for generating profits at the expense of 
their own clients.49 The Volcker Rule sought to put an end to 
the risks and moral quandaries that accompany proprietary 
trading.50 
 
II. FIBA AND THE FINANCIAL CHOICE ACT: 
PUTTING TRUST INTO THE HANDS OF THE 
UNTRUSTWORTHY 
  
With the FIBA and the CHOICE Act Congress has made a 
clear push to put power back in the hands of the major 
financial institutions.51 Both FIBA and the CHOICE Act will 
impose substantial changes to the manner in which major 
financial institutions are processed in times of economic 
crisis.52 Furthermore, the CHOICE Act would mandate 
major changes to the CFPB and its authority to regulate 
major financial firms.53 Additionally, the CHOICE Act 
includes a repeal of the Volcker Rule, which will allow 
commercial banks to engage in high risk, speculative trading 
conducted solely for the profit of the bank.54 
 
                                                 
Implementing Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 387, 388 (2012). 
48 Onnig H. Dombalagian, Proprietary Trading: Of Scourges, Scapegoats, 
and Scofflaws Twenty-Fifth Annual Corporate Law Symposium: 
Implementing Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 387, 388 (2012). 
49 Id.  
50 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (2012). 
51 See infra Part III. 
52 See supra notes 13-15. 
53 See supra note 16. 
54 See supra note 17. 
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A. Repeal of the Orderly Liquidation Authority 
 
If enacted into law, FIBA would essentially dissolve the OLA 
and allow failing financial firms to restructure in bankruptcy 
court.55 However, dissolving the OLA may actually hurt the 
efficacy of many of FIBA’s key provisions.56 The stated 
purpose of the OLA is to quickly and efficiently liquidate 
failing financial firms in times of financial crisis.57 Simply 
put, bankruptcy courts are not as well situated to quickly and 
efficiently handle the liquidation of failing financial firms as 
the OLA is.58 The OLA and its members wield a number of 
skills and benefits that only they are equipped to provide, 
including: knowledge and expertise of American and 
international financial markets; the ability to plan and 
monitor for the possibility of a financial meltdown; 
coordination; and liquidity.59 
 First and foremost, the OLA is comprised of financial 
regulators, many of whom have spent their entire career 
working in the financial industry.60 Not only do these 
regulators possess an extensive knowledge and 
understanding of the American and global financial markets, 
but they also possess the requisite contacts to coordinate 
large scale liquidation of financial institutions with offices 
                                                 
55 Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act of 2017, H.R. 1667, 115th Cong. 
(2017). 
56 Letter from Jeffrey Gordon, et al., Professor, Columbia Law School, to 
members of Congress (May 23, 2017) (on file with author) (explaining that 
“[f]or FIBA to function properly, it needs institutional supports that only 
the OLA and its related rules now provide, making FIBA inadequate as 
the sole resolution mechanism available in a crisis.”). 
57 12 U.S.C.A. § 5384 (2015). 
58 Bernanke, supra note 34 (declaring that “[i]t is simply not plausible 
that judges would be as effective as financial regulators in preparing for 
a speedy resolution or in managing one during a period of high financial 
stress.”). 
59 See Gordon, supra note 56; Bernanke, supra note 34.  
60 Bernanke, supra note 34. 
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across the world.61 Under the current provisions of the OLA, 
regulators are authorized to initiate the liquidation 
proceedings.62 However, this authority would be abolished 
under FIBA, wherein proceedings may only begin once a 
financial institution has filed for bankruptcy.63 Being able to 
initiate liquidation proceedings is critical, as it allows 
regulators to communicate with and acclimatize foreign 
regulators to the bankruptcy process.64 Otherwise foreign 
regulators are liable to seize the assets of the financial 
institution within their jurisdiction, which is often the “death 
knell” for successful bankruptcies.65 
 Furthermore, the Dodd-Frank Act requires 
systemically important financial institutions to maintain 
living wills that provide a plan for their resolution in the 
event of a financial crisis.66 These living wills allow the OLA 
to plan for any potential financial crisis and monitor the 
market and the individual financial firms for signs of 
impending financial stress, and plan appropriate remedial 
measures.67  
Lastly, the OLA is authorized to provide liquidity to 
financial firms when it is deemed necessary.68 Liquidity is 
often vital to stabilizing financial firms.69 However, liquidity 
may only be provided through an FDIC receivership, which 
includes the OLA—bankruptcy judges cannot provide 
                                                 
61 Gordon, supra note 56 (asserting that “[a] U.S. bankruptcy court will 
lack deep prior relationships or the authority to reach understandings 
with foreign regulators in advance of a bankruptcy filing.”). 
62 Id.  
63 Id.  
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 165(d), 
12 U.S.C. § 5325 (2012). 
67 Gordon, supra note 56; Bernanke, supra note 34. 
68 12 U.S.C.A. § 5384 (2015). 
69 Gordon, supra note 56.  
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liquidity.70 Moreover, in addition to the liquidity support 
itself, public knowledge of the liquidity is often immensely 
important in stabilizing financial markets and ensuring the 
American public retains confidence in the American financial 
industry.71 
 In short, the OLA provides a number of key benefits 
that are unique in this day in age.72 The FIBA and the 
Financial CHOICE Act abolish the OLA and replace it with 
a court system that is ill-equipped to handle the dissolution 
of financial firms in times of economic crisis.73 The vigor of 
the system proposed by these acts would be severely 
diminished by the repeal of the OLA.74 If this proposed 
system is to be enacted, it must be enacted alongside the 
OLA, not in place of the OLA.75 
 
B. Reprieve from Enhanced Prudential 
Regulations 
 
The Financial CHOICE Act proposes to replace the CFPB 
with the Consumer Law Enforcement Agency (the “CLEA”).76 
The CLEA would inherit many of the same rulemaking 
authorities of the CFPB, however, it would not retain the 
authority to conduct examinations or supervise any of the 
activities of major financial firms.77 Furthermore, the CLEA 
would be required to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of every 
                                                 
70 Id. 
71 Id.  
72 See infra note 58 and accompanying text. 
73 Randall D. Guynn, Are Bailouts Inevitable, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 137 
(2012) (explaining that the stresses of a global financial panic expose the 
weaknesses of the Bankruptcy Code when it is the only available option). 
74 Gordon, supra note 56. 
75 Id. 
76 MARC LABONTE, ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE FINANCIAL 
CHOICE ACT IN 115TH CONGRESS: SELECTED POLICY ISSUES 29 (2017). 
77 Id. 
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proposed enforcement action prior to implementing or 
engaging in such actions.78 And unlike the CFPB, the CLEA 
would not have the authority to “prohibit unfair, deceptive, 
and abusive acts or practices in consumer financial 
markets.”79  
In addition to the loosening of regulatory restrictions 
precipitated by the proposed changes to the CFPB, the 
Financial CHOICE Act also provides a “regulatory off-ramp” 
for major financial institutions.80 This “regulatory off-ramp” 
essentially allows for financial institutions that are covered 
by the current regulatory standards to opt out of enhanced 
regulations81 in exchange for subjecting the institution to a 
higher, ten percent leverage ratio.82 
These proposed changes represent an abrupt shift in 
economic regulation; scaling back many of the more robust 
features of the Dodd-Frank Act.83 Such a drastic reduction in 
economic regulation is troubling because it represents a 
                                                 
78 Id.  
79 Id.  
80 Lee A. Meyerson & Spencer A. Sloan, Treasury Department Issues 
Recommendations on Reforming the U.S. Financial System, HARV. L. 
SCH., (Jun. 23, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/06/23/ 
treasury-department-issues-recommendations-on-reforming-the-u-s-
financial-system/. 
81 These regulations include, but are not limited to: risk-based and 
leverage capital requirements, liquidity standards, requirements for 
overall risk management (including establishing a risk committee), 
stress-test requirements, and a 150-to-1 debt-to-equity limit for 
companies that the Financial Stability Oversight Committee has 
determined pose a grave threat to financial stability. 12 C.F.R. § 252.32-
35 (2018). 
82 Labonte, supra note 76, at 6. 
83 Paul Lee, The CHOICE Act Is a Bad Choice for Financial Reform, THE 
CLS BLUE SKY BLOG: COLUM. L. SCH., (Sep. 26, 2017) (observing that 
“[t]here are few precedents in modern political history for such a rapid 
and fundamental reversal of course,” and that the Financial CHOICE Act 
would “repeal or severely circumscribe most of the Dodd-Frank Act 
provisions aimed at systemic risk.”). 
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“social amnesia.”84 In scaling back regulations, Congress 
again opens the door for financial institutions to engage in 
morally and financially suspect deals that may drag the 
American economy into another financial crisis.85 Indeed, 
many of the regulations proposed by the Financial CHOICE 
Act are not economically viable.86 For example, currently 
none of the largest American banks are capable of meeting 
the ten-percent leverage ratio required for the “regulatory 
off-ramp.”87 Moreover, many experts question the wisdom of 
using a sole measure, such as the ten percent leverage ratio 
in this case, to measure the financial health of an 
institution.88 The “regulatory off-ramp” stands as an example 
of the broader objective of the aims of the Financial Choice 
Act: deregulation.89  
The Financial CHOICE Act replaces the CFPB with an 
agency that has far less authority to stamp out financially 
and morally dubious banking practices.90 Additionally, the 
CHOICE Act purports to allow for financial institutions to 
escape the enhanced standards Dodd-Frank established in 
exchange for meeting a standard that none of the major 
banks are capable of meeting.91 In short, the Financial 
CHOICE Act repeals a vast majority of the regulations 
designed to prevent another financial crisis all in the name 
                                                 
84 John C. Coffee Jr., Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial 
Reform Tends to be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated 
Symposium: Financial Regulatory Reform in the Wake of the Dodd-Frank 
Act, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1078 (2012). 
85 Id. at 1079. 
86 Lee, supra note 83. 
87 Id.  
88 Id. 
89 163 CONG. REC. H4717 (daily ed. June 8, 2017) (statement of Rep. 
Waters) (labeling the Financial CHOICE Act a “vehicle for Donald 
Trump’s agenda to deregulate and help out Wall Street.”). 
90 Labonte, supra note 76, at 29. 
91 Lee, supra note 83. 
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of increasing short term financial growth.92 The CHOICE Act 
represents a myopic aim of short-term financial growth at the 
potential cost of another financial crisis in the mold of the 
Great Recession.93 
 
C. Decrease in Financial Stress-Testing 
 
One of the cornerstones of the proposed CHOICE Act, the 
“regulatory off-ramp,” allows major financial institutions to 
regain many of the liberties they enjoyed prior to the 
financial crisis of 2007.94 This “regulatory off-ramp” would 
allow for a drastic reduction in financial stress testing 
requirements in systemically important financial 
institutions.95 Stress testing requires financial institutions to 
maintain capital that is not tied up in bad loans or risky 
investments.96 These financial stress tests seek to ensure 
that financial systems are capable of surviving another 
financial disaster precipitated by a wide array of factors.97 
The Federal Reserve currently runs financial systems 
through a litany of hypothetical scenarios to help mold 
financial regulations and assess the capabilities of American 
financial institutions to weather the storm of another 
financial disaster.98 For example, in 2016 the Federal 
Reserve implemented a stress test in which banks were 
forced to assess their ability to cope with negative U.S. short-
term Treasury rates, in addition to major losses to their 
                                                 
92 Id. 
93 Coffee, supra note 84. 
94 H. Rodgin Cohen & Samuel R. Woodall III, Financial CHOICE Act of 
2017, HARV. L. SCH.: F. CORP. GOV’T FIN. REG. (Jun. 15, 2017), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/06/15/financial-choice-act-of-2017/. 
95 Id. 
96 Margaret Ryznar et al, Implementing Dodd-Frank Act Stress Testing, 
14 DEPAUL BUS. & CO. 323, 324 (2016).   
97 Id. at 325.  
98 Id.  
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corporate and commercial real estate lending portfolios.99 
Thus, stress testing is “an important macroprudential 
regulatory tool,” as it enables financial regulators to attain a 
“deeper and broader view of the future health” of financial 
institutions under a myriad of scenarios.100 
The Financial CHOICE Act of 2017 seeks to 
implement a number of modifications to current stress 
testing standards that would profoundly inhibit the efficacy 
of the testing.101 First and foremost, the Comprehensive 
Capital Analysis and Review (“CCAR”) process would be 
conducted every two years, rather than every year.102 The 
CCAR process is the method by which financial regulators 
determine whether a financial institution has an adequate 
amount of capital to survive another financial disaster.103 In 
addition to limiting application of the CCAR process to every 
two years, the Financial CHOICE Act would also eliminate 
all mid-year stress test processes.104 Furthermore, the 
Federal Reserve would be required to disclose the economic 
conditions used for stress testing, as well as solicit public 
comment on these conditions.105 The Financial CHOICE Act 
of 2017 would also prohibit the Federal Reserve from using 
the CCAR qualitative assessment to prohibit a bank from 
making a planned distribution.106 Under the current system 
a dedicated supervisory team, run by the Federal Reserve, 
                                                 
99 Id.  
100 Behzad Gohari & Karen E. Woody, The New Global Financial 
Regulatory Order: Can Macroprudential Regulation Prevent Another 
Global Financial Disaster? 40 J. CORP. L. 403, 432 (2015).  
101 Cohen & Woodhall, supra note 94.  
102 Id.  
103 Stress Tests and Capital Planning, FED. RES. (Mar. 7, 2017), https:// 
www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/stress-tests-capital-planning 
.htm. 
104 Cohen & Woodhall, supra note 94.  
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has the authority to object to a financial institution’s capital 
plan, based on the firm’s qualitative assessment.107 
Therefore, under the rules proposed by the CHOICE Act of 
2017, even if a qualitative assessment reveals that a financial 
institution has a substantial lack of capital to survive a 
financial disaster, the Federal Reserve is powerless to 
prevent the institution from engaging in bad loans and risky 
investments.108 
 The essence of stress testing is ensuring that financial 
systems are healthy and capable of surviving another 
financial disaster.109 The CHOICE Act of 2017 seeks to 
implement significant reductions in the vitality of stress 
testing.110 However, the American financial sector is ill-
prepared for such a drastic reduction in stress testing.111 
Citigroup has failed Dodd-Frank stress tests twice, and 
Goldman Sachs and Bank of America would have failed if 
they had not amended their capital distribution.112  A critical 
factor in the facilitation of the financial crisis of 2007-2008 
was a profound lack of financial stress testing—banks were 
simply unaware of how their institution would cope with the 
advent of financial crisis.113 Moreover, the implementation of 
stress testing throughout the financial sector has found 
“great success both for the health of the institutions and the 
                                                 
107 Qualitative Assessment Framework, Process, and Summary of Results, 
FED. RES. (Aug. 23, 2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/ 
2017-june-ccar-assessment-framework-results-qualitative-assessment 
.htm (explaining that dedicated supervisory teams have the authority to 
“formulate a recommendation” to the Federal Reserve “to object or not to 
object to a firm’s capital plan based on” the qualitative assessment). 
108 Cohen & Woodhall, supra note 94.  
109 Ryznar et al., supra note 96. 
110 See Cohen & Woodhall, supra note 94, at 325. 
111 Ryznar et al., supra note 96, at 346.  
112 Id. at 325=26. 
113 Eugene A. Ludwig, Assessment of Dodd-Frank Financial Regulatory 
Reform: Strengths, Challenges, and Opportunities for a Stronger 
Regulatory Reform, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 181, 186 (2012). 
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marketplace.”114 Therefore, financial stress testing should 
not be scaled down merely because financial institutions 
have survived the financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the 
ensuing financial turmoil.115  
Conversely, some commentators argue that the 
current stress testing protocols do not go far enough to ensure 
that financial institutions are capable of surviving yet 
another financial meltdown.116 Robert Weber contends that 
current stress testing procedures are more akin to “audit-like 
exercises that validate existing business practices and 
mathematical models,” than earnest attempts to discern the 
financial vitality of systemically important financial 
institutions.117 For financial regulations to work to their full 
potential, stress testing of financial regulations must truly be 
“conceptualized as multi-actor deliberations on how a firm 
might fail.”118 Thus, while the stress testing regulations 
implemented by Dodd-Frank are a step in the right direction, 
they must evolve into more comprehensive and vigorous 
evaluations in order to truly ensure the health of financial 
institutions.119 Ultimately, if current financial stress testing 
does not go far enough to ensure the health of major financial 
institutions, the regulations should be enhanced, not 
repealed.120  
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115 Daniel K. Tarullo, The Departing Remarks of Federal Reserve Governor 
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D. Repeal of the Volcker Rule  
 
Title IX of the Financial CHOICE ACT provides for the 
repeal of the Volcker Rule.121 As previously mentioned, the 
Volcker Rule acts as a ban on proprietary trading – or what 
amounts to highly speculative and risky trading that only the 
bank stands to profit from.122 The Volcker Rule was enacted 
in order to prevent highly speculative trading, as well as the 
conflicts of interests that arise out of this trading, where 
banks may be incentivized to mislead or deceive their own 
customers regarding the buying of securities.123  
 Deregulation allowed commercial banks to compete 
with investment banks and securities firms through high 
risk and complex proprietary trading.124 Commercial banks 
became increasingly reliant on proprietary trading as a form 
of revenue.125 However, proprietary trading left banks 
financially vulnerable; in the fourth financial quarter of 2007 
losses from proprietary trading amounted to almost 250 
percent of net operating revenue.126 In addition to the risky 
and speculative nature of the deals, proprietary trading 
carries an innate propensity to create conflicts of interest 
among large financial institutions.127 Proprietary trading 
creates situations where financial institutions stand to profit 
by either marketing products to their own clients that are 
designed to fail or using client trading information against 
                                                 
121 H.R. 10, 115th Cong. § 901 (2017). 
122 Grant, supra note 46. 
123 Andrew F. Tuch, Conflicted Gatekeepers: The Volcker Rule and 
Goldman Sachs, 7 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 365, 373 (2012). 
124 Grant, supra note 46, at 1226-27. 
125 Merkley & Levin, supra note 47. 
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the interests of that same client by leveraging the client 
information to secure better trading deals for the bank 
itself.128 Repeal of the Volcker Rule would allow banks to once 
more engage in trade deals that crippled domestic and 
international financial markets129 and turned them against 
their own clients.130 The best way to ensure that financial 
institutions do not repeat past behavior of treacherous trade 
deals and rampant conflicts of interest is through a robust 
regulation system.131 Nevertheless, the Financial CHOICE 
Act seeks to repeal the very rule that prohibits a substantial 
amount of the activity that contributed to the financial crisis 
and once more allows large financial institutions the freedom 
to leverage the money of their own client for speculative gains 
of megabanks.132  
 
E. Culture Change: Diversifying and Regulating  
 
As previously discussed, the financial crisis of 2007-2008 was 
ushered in by an era of deregulation that gave way to reckless 
and irresponsible financial decisions.133 However, these poor 
financial decisions were, in turn, precipitated by a culture 
within many large firms that encouraged and glorified profits 
                                                 
128 Id. at 522-526. 
129 Id. at 515 (stating that proprietary trading “played a critical role” in 
creating the financial crisis of 2007-2008). 
130 Id. at 522. 
131 Merkley & Levin, supra note 47, at 553 (declaring that the financial 
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allowing for proprietary trading to continue unabated”). 
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133 Kristin Johnson et al., Diversifying to Mitigate Risk: Can Dodd-Frank 
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1795, 1797 (2016) (explaining that many large financial firms “engineered 
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at any cost, and ultimately facilitated financial disaster.134 
Dodd-Frank was intended to change both the culture 
surrounding regulation of financial firms, as well as the 
culture within financial firms.135  
 
1. Promoting Diversity and Stability 
 
Prior to the financial crisis, many firms were blighted by 
“[u]nprecedented compensation and brazen behavior,” which 
gave way to an “environment devoid of accountability.”136 The 
American financial sector was dominated by a culture of 
“egotism and bravado” that only exacerbated poor financial 
decisions and a disregard for financial accountability and 
stability.137 Wall street was dominated by the “cowboy 
culture” of major financial institutions, where the corporate 
culture “feeds on itself, and people rise up the ranks, who are 
its exemplars and cheerleaders and who are risk takers, 
too.”138 Corporate culture was warped into a culture that 
glorified financial gain above all else and fostered a culture 
of excessive risk taking and glorification of money, thereby 
creating a culture that would lead to financial disaster.139 
 In response to this toxic culture, Dodd-Frank 
instituted a number of reforms to increase diversity and 
                                                 
134 See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY REP. xix 
2011 (finding that the financial crisis was facilitated by “stunning 
instances of governance breakdowns and irresponsibility” within major 
financial institutions).  
135 See generally Johnson et al., supra note 133. 
136 Johnson et al., supra note 133, at 1799. 
137 Id. at 1801. 
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139 See generally Langevoort, Chasing the Greased Pig Down Wall Street: 
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inclusions within corporate structures.140 Prior to the 
passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, only two of the twenty-five 
largest banks in the county were headed by a minority, and 
none were headed by a woman.141 Section 342 provided for a 
number of reforms seeking to foster a new culture of financial 
responsibility and accountability within financial 
institutions.142 For example, Section 342 requires all federal 
agencies to establish an Office of Minority and Women 
Inclusion.143 The Office of Minority and Women Inclusion is 
responsible for ensuring that diversity is leveraged 
throughout the agencies and in all matters governed by each 
respective agency.144 
 Reforms promoting diversity within corporate 
structure may prove to have profound effects on the stability 
of the financial sector.145 For example, one study found 
women to be more risk averse than men.146 Furthermore, 
African-American and Hispanic households “also display 
more risk aversion than white households in their 
investment choices,” in the post financial crisis era.147 
Additionally, there is substantial data to suggest that market 
bubbles are fueled by the “ethnic homogeneity of traders,” 
which “imbues people with false confidence in the judgment 
of coethnics, discouraging them from scrutinizing 
                                                 
140 12 U.S.C. § 5452 (2012). 
141 Johnson et al., supra note 133, at 1843. 
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behavior.”148 Studies have further suggested that firms with 
a high degree of diversity amongst governing boards “achieve 
higher corporate social responsibility ratings.”149 
 
2. Regulating a Deregulated Industry 
 
Generally, in the years leading up to the financial crisis, the 
financial sector was regulated by way of deregulation; the 
market was seen as a self-regulating entity.150 This period of 
deregulation gave financial institutions a wide berth to 
engage in behavior that resulted in short-term gains, but 
later resulted in financial catastrophe.151  
Dodd-Frank is a direct response to the years of 
deregulation and systemic deficiencies in stability and 
accountability.152 Dodd-Frank implements a number of 
measures that are directly tailored to combat the excessive 
risk taking and lack of accountability that directly facilitated 
the Great Recession.153 Dodd-Frank—and the broader 
scheme of regulation that it represents, macroprudential 
regulation—is actively seen as “the most credible policy and 
regulatory mechanism for the prevention of systemic shocks, 
                                                 
148 Id. at 1814 (citing Sheen S. Levine et al., Ethnic Diversity Deflates 
Bubble Prices, 111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 18524, 18524 (2014)). 
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150 The Causes and Current State of the Financial Crisis Before the 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, FDIC.GOV (Jan. 14, 2010) 
(statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance 
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and the management of any systemic risk in the financial 
services industry.”154 
As such, Dodd-Frank’s reforms are critical pieces of 
legislation that seek to remedy the systemic issues 
culminating in the Great Recession.155 Yet the reforms are 
also highly important for what they represent: a repudiation 
of the practices that crippled the American economy.156 Dodd-
Frank represents an acknowledgement of the importance of 
financial accountability and stability, as well as the critical 
role that diversity plays in upholding those ideals.157 The 
Financial CHOICE Act not only repeals many key 
regulations that promote financial stability and 
accountability, but it repeals the culture change and 
reinstitutes the culture that glorified risky investments, a 
lack of accountability, and unbridled egotism and 
homogeneity.158 
 
3. De-politicizing Regulation: Letting Regulators 
Regulate 
 
One of the central concepts at issue in the debate between 
Dodd-Frank and the CHOICE Act and FIBA is the extent of 
regulation.159 Simply put, there is a burgeoning ideological 
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rift as to how much regulation should be implemented and 
who should oversee the implementation.160 The CHOICE 
ACT and FIBA intend to strip away many key financial 
regulations of Dodd-Frank and allow much greater freedom 
to major financial institutions.161 Charles Murdock explains 
that a major issue with the proposed changes of the Financial 
CHOICE Act and FIBA “is that our financial regulators 
frequently come from the financial industry, and often go 
back to it.”162  
One of the cornerstones of the CHOICE Act is taking 
regulatory powers away from regulatory agencies and giving 
major financial institutions broader authority to regulate 
themselves.163 Financial regulation over the past several 
decades has been defined by a “deregulatory mindset,” as 
well as “timidity and deference to the banking regulators.”164 
The financial crisis of the 2000s has proven that regulations 
cannot be implemented only when the financial sector is on 
the brink of crisis.165 Rather, regulation must be robust and 
proactive.166 Regulation is most effective when it is used as a 
platform to prevent systemically important financial 
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institutions from crippling the entire financial sector and 
spreading loss throughout the broader economy.167  
Moreover, following the financial crisis of the 2000s, 
politicians in the United States and around the world 
assumed many of the responsibilities previously held by 
independent non-partisan financial regulators.168 However, 
politicians are compelled to “make bailout decisions in the 
headwinds of electoral strategizing, ideological polarization, 
and interest group pressures.”169 Not only are independent 
regulators free from the political considerations that 
influence politicians, but independent financial regulators 
almost invariably possess the technical expertise required to 
effectively regulate the financial sector.170 It is imperative 
that regulation of the American financial sector is left in the 
hands of independent regulators, and that regulations or 
deregulations are not implemented as a means of satisfying 




The Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act and the Financial 
CHOICE Act restore far too much freedom to the hands of 
persons and institutions that have proven they cannot be 
trusted to act without regulations and safeguards.171 It is 
well established that the financial crisis of 2007-2008 was 
ushered in by an era of unchecked and unbridled greed, 
speculation, and excessive risk taking.172 The Dodd-Frank 
Act is by no means a perfect solution to the systemic issues 
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that gave way to a financial meltdown. However, the Dodd-
Frank Act must not be repealed without a meaningful 
replacement, as the Act helps to prevent the systemic risk 
that facilitated the financial crisis of 2007-2008.173 FIBA and 
the CHOICE Act repeal a substantial portion of the Dodd-
Frank Act without enacting meaningful reform to replace 
it.174 By returning to an era of deregulation less than a 
decade after one of the greatest financial crises in this 
country’s history, Congress has opened the door for financial 
institutions to once more betray the interests of their own 
clients and pursue risky and potentially ruinous investments 
and trade deals.175 FIBA and the CHOICE Act represent a 
dangerous shift in financial legislation, once more opening 
the door for yet another financial disaster, all in the name of 
deregulation.176  
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